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Abstract 
Paul   Ricoeur   clearly   sought   to   differentiate   between   and   keep   separate   his   philosophical   and   theological  
intellectual   endeavors.   This   essay   brings   into   relief   a   deep,   implicit,   recapitulative   pattern   in   Ricoeur’s  
thinking   that   cuts  across   this   explicit   “conceptual   asceticism.”  Specifically,   it  highlights   this   recapitulative  
pattern  in  Ricoeur’s  treatment  of  prophecy  in  the  Hebrew  Bible;  his  understanding  of  utopia  and  ideology;  
the   functioning   of   symbols   in  The   Symbolism   of   Evil   and   of   sublimation   in  Freud   and   Philosophy.  On   these  
topics  Ricoeur  extended  his  typical  generosity  toward  all  that  might  appear  to  be  outdated,  primitive,  and  
even  regressive   in  our  collective  and  personal  humanity.  The  frequently  recapitulative  nature  of  Ricoeur’s  
insights  indicates  the  importance  not  just  of  the  content  of  his  thought  but  also  the  way  in  which  he  did  his  
thinking,  a  pattern  which  above  all  was  generous,  even  to  a  fault.  
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Résumé 
Paul   Ricœur   a   clairement   cherché   à   différencier   et   séparer   ses   efforts   intellectuels   philosophiques   et  
théologiques.  Cet  essai  met  en  relief  un  profond,  implicite,  récapitulatif  motif  dans  la  pensée  de  Paul  Ricœur  
qui  transgresse  cette  explicite  “ascèse  conceptuelle.”  Plus  précisément,  il  souligne  ce  motif  récapitulatif  dans  
sa   traitement   de   la   prophétie   dans   la   Bible   Hébraïque;   sa   compréhension   de   l'ʹutopie   et   l'ʹidéologie,   le  
fonctionnement  des  symboles  dans  Le  Symbolisme  du  Mal,  et  la  sublimation  dans  De  l’interprétation:  Essai  sur  
Freud.  En  relation  avec  ces  sujets  Ricoeur  a  étendu  sa  générosité  typique  envers  tout  qui  pourrait  apparaître  
dépassée,  primitive,  et  même  régressive  dans  notre  humanité  collective  et  personnelle.  Le  caractère  souvent  
récapitulatif  des  idées  de  Ricoeur  indiquent  l'ʹimportance  non  seulement  du  contenu  de  sa  pensée,  mais  aussi  
la  manière  dont  il  a  pensé,  un  modèle  qui  avant  tout  était  généreux,  même  à  une  faute.  
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Throughout   his   academic   career   Paul   Ricoeur   consistently   sought   to   differentiate  
between   and   keep   separate   his   philosophical   and   theological   intellectual   endeavors.   One  
prominent   example   of   this   “conceptual   asceticism”   appears   in  Ricoeur’s  Oneself   as  Another;   the  
basis   for   this  work  were   the  Gifford  Lectures   that  Ricoeur  delivered   in  Edinburgh   in   1986,   the  
purpose  of  which  lecture  series  is  to  “promote  and  diffuse  the  study  of  Natural  Theology  in  the  
widest  sense  of  the  term—in  other  words,  the  knowledge  of  God.”1  It  is  thus  noteworthy  that  in  
the   version   of   the   lectures   published   as   a   book   Ricoeur   omitted   the   two   concluding   lectures  
which  were   the  most   explicitly   theological   in   nature.   In   the   introduction   to  Oneself   as   Another  
Ricoeur  provided  the  following  rationale  for  this  omission:  
The   primary   reason   for   excluding   them…has   to   do   with   my  
concern   to   pursue,   to   the   very   last   line,   an   autonomous,  
philosophical  discourse.  The  ten  studies  that  make  up  this  work  
assume  the  bracketing,  conscious  and  resolute,  of  the  convictions  
that   bind   me   to   biblical   faith…It   will   be   observed   that   this  
asceticism   of   the   argument,   which   marks,   I   believe,   all   my  
philosophical   work,   leads   to   a   type   of   philosophy   from  which  
the  actual  mention  of  God  is  absent  and  in  which  the  question  of  
God,  as  a  philosophical  question,   itself  remains   in  a  suspension  
that  could  be  called  agnostic.2  
However,   in   the   same   paragraph   from  which   the   preceding   citation   is   drawn   Ricoeur  
readily   acknowledged   that   below   the   level   of   disciplinary  methodology   and   specific   topics   his  
intellectual  interests  and  the  manner  in  which  he  pursued  them  could  very  well  be  influenced  in  
an  unconscious  way  by  his  personal  convictions.3  This  essay  will  bring  into  relief  just  such  a  deep  
pattern   in   Ricoeur’s   thinking   that   appears   to   underlie   a   number   of   his   published  works,   both  
philosophical   and   theological,   that   is   recapitulative   in   nature   and   which   cuts   across   the   strict  
“conceptual   asceticism”   he   maintained   on   the   level   of   his   explicit   argumentation.   While   this  
pattern   is   evident   in   a   great   number   of   Ricoeur’s  works,   in   this   essay   the   focus  will   be   on   its  
existence   in:   his   treatment   of   prophecy   in   the   Hebrew   Bible;   his   understanding   of   utopia,  
ideology,   and   their   inter-­‐‑relation;   the   functioning   of   symbols   in   The   Symbolism   of   Evil;   and  
sublimation   in   Freud   and   Philosophy.   In   relation   to   these   topics   Ricoeur   extended   his   typical  
generosity   toward   all   that  might   appear   to   be   outdated,   primitive,   and   even   regressive   in   our  
collective  and  personal  humanity.  In  his  vision  we  cannot  simply  cut  off  the  most  regressive  parts  
of  ourselves  that  appear  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  realization  of  our  prospective  ideals,  but  we  
must  rather  consent  to  the  long,  slow  process  of  their  transformation  since  the  progressive  only  
arises   out   of   the   regressive   and   via   its   transformation.   The   wager   guiding   the   present  
investigation   is   that   beyond   the   interest   this   topic   holds   for   Ricoeur   specialists,   the   frequently  
recapitulative  nature  of  Ricoeur’s   insights   indicate   the   importance  not   just  of   the   content  of  his  
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thought  but  also  the  way  in  which  he  did  his  thinking,  a  pattern  which  above  all  was  generous,  
generous  even  to  a  fault.  
The  first  manifestation  of  a  deep,  recapitulative  pattern  of   thinking  to  be  treated  in  this  
investigation  is  Ricoeur’s  description  in  the  essay  “Biblical  Time”  of  the  functioning  of  prophecy  
in   the  Hebrew  Bible.  According  to  Ricoeur,  biblical  prophecy  consists  of  a   three  step  dialectical  
progression.    
First,  biblical  prophecy  interrupted  the  experience  of  time  provided  by  the  genres  of  the  
law  and  the  narratives  of  Israel’s  origins.  Ricoeur  takes  pains  to  clarify  that  the  contrast  between  
prophecy  on  the  one  hand  and  the  laws  and  narrative  on  the  other  does  not  take  the  simple  form  
of   an   orientation   to   the   future   (prophecy)   interrupting   an   orientation   to   the   past   (laws   and  
narrative):   this   is   a   “trivial   idea.”  No,   traditional   narratives  were  not   only  directed   toward   the  
past   but   rather  offered  a   consolidating   experience  of   time  as   a  whole  by  projecting   themselves  
toward  the  future  in  the  modality  of  “an  unuprootable  confidence  in  a  security  that  cannot  fail.”4  
In  contrast,  the  prophetic  announcement  of  the  Day  of  the  LORD  as  a  day  not  of  joy  but  of  terror  
provided   a  dislocating   experience   of   time  by   shaking   and   shattering   this   assurance  which  had  
been  “transformed  into  a  possession.”5  
Second,   after   putting   an   end   to   the   future   as   previously   imagined   biblical   prophecy  
demonstrated   its   innovative   quality   by   projecting   visions   of   a   new,   previously   unanticipated  
future.   Israel  cannot  reassure   itself   that   the  future  will  simply  be  an  extension  of   the  present  as  
already  known,  more  of  “the  same”;  no,  the  future  will  have  a  quality  of  interruption,  event,  and  
hence   otherness   that   frustrates   our   desires   for   security   and   control   (appearing   in   this   context  
under  the  guise  of  a  desire  for  a  predictable  future).  
Third,   after   dislocating   the   comfortable   progression   from   assured   tradition   to   assured  
future  inheritance,  and  projecting  an  essentially  new  and  unforeseeable  future,  Hebrew  prophecy  
overcame  the  opposition  between  the  closed  past  and  a  new  future  by  projecting  the  future  as  a  
kind   of   “creative   repetition”   of   the  past.   The  prophets   of   salvation   in   fact   did  not   imagine   the  
unprecedented  quality  of   the  coming  Day  of   the  LORD  in   terms  utterly  heterogeneous   to  all  of  
Israel’s   prior   encounters   with   God,   but   rather   as   a   new   Exodus,   a   new   Zion,   a   new   Davidic  
descendance,   etc.6   This   gives   a   cumulative   quality   to   biblical   narratives,   in   which   subsequent  
events   augment   the   meaning   of   preceding   events.7   Moreover,   by   this   practice   prophecy  
demonstrated   that   the  meaning   of   the   traditional   Biblical   narratives   is   not   exhausted   by   their  
original   or   established  meanings,   but   that   these   traditional   narratives   contain   a   “storehouse   of  
inexhaustible  potentialities.”  In  other  words,  the  creative  repetition  of  the  three-­‐‑step  dialectic  of  
biblical   prophecy   breaks   open   the   “surplus   of  meaning   that,   so   to   speak,   lies   dreaming   in   the  
traditional   narrative.”8   This   is   the   first   instantiation   of   a   recapitulative   pattern   in   Ricoeur’s  
thinking  inasmuch  as  the  prophetic  vision  of  a  new  future  takes  the  shape  of  a  recapitulation  of  
the  past.  
The  second  instantiation  of  a  deep,  recapitulative  pattern  of  thinking  to  be  treated  in  this  
essay   concerns   aspects   of   Ricoeur’s   description   of   ideology,   utopia,   and   their   inter-­‐‑relation.   In  
Ricoeur’s   creative   organization   there   are   three   different   levels   of   ideology9   mirrored   by   three  
different  levels  of  utopia.10  For  the  purposes  of  this  investigation  it  is  not  necessary  to  rehearse  all  
the  details  of  this  schematization,  but  rather  to  focus  upon  Ricoeur’s  affirmation  that  the  utopian  
projection  toward  a  new  future  often  exists  as  a  transformative  recapitulation  of  the  past.  In  his  
Lectures   on   Ideology   and   Utopia   this   theme   appears   in   a   number   of   ways   in   Ricoeur’s   essay   on  
Generous  to  a  Fault  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          
Vol  3,  No  2  (2012)        ISSN  2155-­‐‑1162  (online)        DOI  10.5195/errs.2012.116        http://ricoeur.pitt.edu    
40  
  
Charles  Fourier:  in  the  specific  way  that  in  his  utopia  Fourier  describes  human  passions,  and  God  
and  religion;   in   the   theoretical   inferences  Ricoeur  draws   from  the   former   for   the   functioning  of  
utopia  in  general  and  its  inter-­‐‑relation  with  ideology;  and  concretely  in  his  analysis  of  the  manner  
in  which  Greek  tragedies  remain  an  ongoing  source  of  insight  and  inspiration  for  contemporary  
readers.  
To   begin   with   the   first   of   these   sub-­‐‑thematic   topoi,   according   to   Ricoeur   the   most  
fundamental  aim  of  Fourier’s  utopia  is  his  vision  of  liberating  human  passions,  those  “emotional  
potentialities”   which   have   been   weakened,   repressed,   and   reduced   in   number,   strength,   and  
variety   through   the   influence   of   human   civilization.11   Consequently   Fourier’s   ameliorative  
utopian  vision  deploys  a  well-­‐‑known  trope  within  the  domain  of  ideology  critique,  namely  that  
of  inversion:  if  by  its  malign  transformation  of  virtues  into  censured  vices  society  has  inverted  the  
true  nature   of   reality,   then   the   corresponding   therapy   called   for   by   this   state   of   affairs   is   a   re-­‐‑
inversion.  Alternatively  one  can  use  the  complementary  notion  of  “return”  to  drive  at  much  the  
same  point:  if  civilization  has  repressed  and  forgotten  the  fundamental  law  of  attraction  in  social  
reality,   then   any  prospective   vision   leading   out   of   this   “hell”  must   actually   take   the   form  of   a  
recollection  of  our  true  nature,  a  return  to  a  more  fundamental  “Edenic”  state.  In  sum,  and  to  use  
Ricoeur’s  delightful  expression,  coupling  the  schemas  of  return  and  inversion  we  can  say  that  in  
Fourier’s  utopian  vision  of  liberating  repressed  human  passions,  “The  return  is  a  re-­‐‑turn.”12    
In   addition,   Ricoeur   observed   a   similar   recapitulative   dynamic   at   play   in   Fourier’s  
description  of  God  and  religion.  Fourier  strongly  rejected  the  punitive  image  of  God  as  a  “cruel  
tyrant”  associated  with  the  preaching  of  hell,  which  in  his  view  functioned  to  divinize  privation.  
In   diametric   opposition   to   such   a   perspective   Fourier   instead   advocated   “the   divinization   of  
delight,”  and  the  consequent  portrayal  of  God  in  terms  of  pleasure.13  Here  again  is  the  theme  of  
inversion,  but  just  as  in  his  depiction  of  human  passions  Fourier’s  utopian  religious  imagination  
also  includes  a  trajectory  of  return.  It  is  interesting  that  Fourier  did  not  imagine  a  utopian  future  
free  of  all  belief  in  God;  rather,  Fourier  sought  to  invert  surface  level  representations  of  God  (from  
wrath  to  delight)  in  order  to  return  to  a  more  fundamental  divine  reality  that  had  been  forgotten  
or   obscured.   Like   his   vision   of   the   need   to   uncover   and   liberate   repressed   human   passions  
Fourier’s   utopian   vision   of   religion   was   consequently   also   recapitulative,   located   between   the  
established,   decadent   religion   of   his   time   and   a   more   fundamental   religion   that   he   believed  
remained   to   be   uncovered   or   invented.14   In   both   of   these   aspects   Ricoeur   drew   attention   to   a  
consistent   feature   of   Fourier’s   projection   of   a   utopian   future:   “The   utopia   claims   to   be   a  
restoration  of  the  primitive  law.  Thus,  it  is  both  progressive  and  regressive.  The  progression  is  in  
fact  a  regression  to  the  divine  law.”15  
His   observation  of   this   recapitulative  dynamic   at  work   in   these   two   specific   aspects   of  
Fourier’s  utopia  led  Ricoeur  to  draw  two  more  general  theoretical  inferences  for  the  functioning  
of  utopia  and  its  inter-­‐‑relation  with  ideology.  On  the  one  hand  Ricoeur  questioned  to  what  extent  
the   quality   of   “return”   characterizes   not   just   Fourier’s   particular   utopian   vision,   but   rather  
utopian  imagination  in  general:  
To   what   extent   is   utopia’s   futurism   fundamentally   a   return?  
Fourier   comments   quite   often   that   what   he   advocates   is   not   a  
reform  but  a  return,  a  return  to  the  root.  He  has  many  pages  on  
the   topic   of   forgetfulness.   This   theme   is   also   prevalent   in  
Nietzsche   and   in   others   such   as  Heidegger;   the   idea   is   that  we  
have  forgotten  something,  and  consequently  our  problem  is  not  
Joél  Z.  Schmidt  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





so  much  to  invent  as  to  rediscover  what  we  have  forgotten.  In  a  
sense   all   founders   of   philosophies,   religions,   and   cultures   say  
that  they  are  bringing  forth  something  that  already  existed...The  
new  logos  is  always  an  ancient  logos.16  
On   the  other  hand,  Ricoeur  argued   for   the  necessity  of  healing  what   is  negative   in  utopia  with  
what  is  positive  in  ideology  and  vice  versa.17  By  their  excentricity  utopias  tend  to  abstract  so  fully  
from  what  is  that  they  provide  no  indication  of  how  to  move  from  the  “here”  of  the  current  state  
of  affairs  to  the  “elsewhere”  of  the  projected  perfection.  To  this  pathology  of  utopia  the  positive  
integrating  function  of  ideology  can  serve  as  a  healing  tonic.18  Here  too  we  have  an  example  of  a  
dynamic   in   which   the   progressive   only   attains   its   liberating   aims,   paradoxically,   by   drawing  
upon  that  which  appears  to  be  regressive.  
Finally,   near   the   end   of   his   essay   on   Fourier   Ricoeur   analyzes   how   Greek   tragedies  
remain  an  ongoing  source  of  insight  and  inspiration  for  contemporary  readers  in  a  manner  that  
seems   to   represent   a   concrete   instantiation   of   the   recapitulative   dynamic   he   described   in   this  
essay.  In  Ricoeur’s  view,  when  we  return  again  and  again  to  the  ancient  Greek  tragedies  we  do  
not   seek   in   them   simply   an   expression   of   the   ancient   Greece.   Rather,   we   are   drawn   to   their  
“projective  ideas,”  that  which  they  continue  to  open  and  disclose  for  us  today,  which  testifies  to  
their  capacity  to  be  decontextualized  from  their  original  setting  and  recontextualized  in  our  own.  
For   this   reason   we   cannot   say   that   the   Greek   tragedies   merely   reflect   the   context   of   their  
production:  they  are  not  merely  echoes  or  “reflections  in  the  sense  of  mirroring,”  but  rather  have  
a  generative  capacity  which  enables  them  to  “open  outward  to  new  times,”  a  power  to  speak  for  
many  time  periods.19  Here  Ricoeur’s  description  of  the  continuing  capacity  of  Greek  myths  to  be  
meaningful   to   people   today,   of   how   contemporary   people   can   turn   back   to   the   ancient   Greek  
myths  in  order  to  discover  new  meanings  for  today,  vividly  recalls  his  description  of  the  three-­‐‑
step  dialectic  of  biblical  prophecy  as  a  creative  repetition.  It  also  clearly  reflects  this  dynamic  as  
Ricoeur  described  it   in  his  analysis  of  Fourier’s  utopia  and  the  general   theoretical   inferences  he  
drew   from   it   as   a   result;   while   Ricoeur   does   not   explicitly   label   his   analysis   of   the   ongoing  
meaningfulness   of   ancient   Greek   tragedies   as   a   concrete   instantiation   of   the   dynamic   he  
identified   in  Fourier’s  utopia,   it  seems  to   function  as  such.  Thus,   the  capacity  of   tragedies   from  
ancient  Greece  to  speak  to  us  today  illustrates  the  same  schema  of  creative  return,  repetition  with  
a  surplus,   that  Ricoeur   identified   in:  his  analysis  of  Fourier’s  utopian  description  of   the  human  
passions,  and  God  and  religion;  and  in  the  theoretical   inferences  Ricoeur  drew  from  the  former  
for  the  functioning  of  utopia  in  general  and  its  inter-­‐‑relation  with  ideology.  All  of  the  foregoing  
are  ways  in  which  a  recapitulative  dynamic  is  manifest  in  Ricoeur’s  description  of  and  reflections  
upon  Fourier’s  utopia.  
A   third   manifestation   of   a   recapitulative   pattern   in   Ricoeur’s   thinking   is   his  
understanding   of   the  multi-­‐‑level   organization   of   symbols   in  The   Symbolism   of   Evil.20  As   is  well  
known,   Ricoeur   divided   symbols   into   primary,   secondary,   and   tertiary   levels,   each   of   which  
fulfills   a  different   function.  At   the  primary   level   symbols   function   to  bring  mute   experience   to  
speech,   for   instance,   the   various   symbols   of   defilement,   sin,   and   guilt   give   expression   to   the  
experience  of  evil;  on  its  own  experience  is  “blind...still  embedded  in  the  matrix  of  emotion,  fear,  
anguish,”  but  once  expressed   in   symbols   this   experience   is  brought   into   language  which   is   the  
light   of   the   emotions.21   In   contrast,   secondary   symbols   are  myths  which   present   a   “first-­‐‑order  
hermeneutics”  of  the  primary  symbols,  e.g.,  the  creation  myths  in  Genesis.  Tertiary  or  speculative  
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symbols   in   turn   present   a   “second-­‐‑order   hermeneutics”   of   both   the   primary   and   secondary  
symbols,  for  instance,  the  theological  doctrine  of  original  sin.22  
The  important  point  for  the  current  investigation  in  relation  to  this  tripartite  organization  
of  symbols  is  the  way  in  which  according  to  Ricoeur  a  recapitulative  dynamic  is  operative  in  the  
transition   from  primary   to   secondary   to   tertiary   symbols.   In   this   ascending  movement  Ricoeur  
described  a  complex  interplay  between  enigmatic  semantic  density  and  univocal  lucidity,  related  
to   his   agenda   in   this   book   to   explore   the   relationship   between   philosophical   reflection   and  
symbolic  expressions,  such  that  he  posited  an  inverse  relationship  between  conceptual  clarity  and  
richness   of   meaning.23   That   is,   he   argued   that   in   the   ascent   from   primary   symbols   (such   as  
“defilement”)   to   secondary   symbols   (such   as   the   Genesis   creation   myths)   to   tertiary   symbols  
(such   as   the   theological   doctrine   of   original   sin)   the   increasingly   lucid   articulation   of   symbolic  
meaning  is   inversely  correlated  with  a  corresponding  “impoverishment  of  symbolic  richness.”24  
Between   the   two   extremes   of   complete   opacity   and   univocal   allegorizing   exegesis   Ricoeur  
wanted  to  forge  a  path  of  creative  interpretation  of  meaning,  “faithful  to  the  impulsion,  to  the  gift  
of  meaning  from  the  symbol,  and  faithful  also  to  the  philosopher’s  oath  to  seek  understanding.”25  
This   is   what   Ricoeur   found   suggested   in   the   Kantian   expression   “The   symbol   gives   rise   to  
thought.”26   It   is   for   this   reason   that   each   step   from   symbol   to   myth   to   speculative   thought  
“maintains  itself  only  by  taking  up  the  symbolic  charge  of  the  preceding  [step],”27  such  that  both  
first-­‐‑  and  second-­‐‑order  hermeneutics  only  interpret  a  richness  of  symbolic  meaning  that  precedes  
their   successively   more   pure   rational   elaboration.28   Higher   symbolic   levels   draw   upon   and  
transform   the   relatively   richer   but   also  more   ambiguous  meanings   of   lower   symbolic   levels   to  
generate   their   relatively   more   clear   conceptual   articulations,   they   recapitulate   powerful   and  
primitive  expressions  in  their  own  more  advanced  intellectual  productions.  
   A   second   way   in   which   a   recapitulative   dynamic   structures   The   Symbolism   of   Evil  
concerns  Ricoeur’s  description  of  the  functioning  of  symbols  within  rather  than  across  symbolic  
levels,   which   can   be   illustrated   by   examining   Ricoeur’s   analysis   of   the   primary   symbols   of  
defilement,  sin,  and  guilt.  Within  the  primary  level  each  of  these  symbols  has  a  unique  semantic  
field,  which  Ricoeur  hierarchized  in  terms  of  their  relative  degree  of  sophistication:  for  example,  
he   characterized   “defilement”   as   the   most   primitive   symbol   of   evil,   drawing   as   it   does   upon  
experiences  of  physical  contamination  and  contagion;  in  contrast  “sin”  construed  as  missing  the  
mark  (hamartano)  has  an  interpersonal  frame  of  reference,  emphasizing  the  rupture  of  a  relation;  
and  finally  the  most  refined  symbol  of  “guilt”  incorporates  the  internal,  subjective  experience  of  
the   conscience   unhappily   aware   of   an   evil   use   of   liberty   which   has   diminished   the   self.29  
Nevertheless,   in   a  manner   akin   to   the   relationship   he   articulated   between  primary,   secondary,  
and  tertiary  symbolic  levels,  according  to  Ricoeur  within  the  level  of  primary  symbols  each  of  the  
successive   “advances”   in   symbolic   representation   from   the   schema   of   defilement   evince  
continuity  with  and  indeed  draw  upon  the  schema  of  defilement  for  their  power.  Thus,  while  the  
symbol   of   “sin”   shifts   the   focus   from   contagion   to   the   rupture   of   a   relation,   it   nevertheless  
conserves   an   objective,   ontological   aspect   to   the   experience   of   evil   (akin   to   the   externality   of  
defilement)   in   a   variety   of   ways:   for   example   as   a   condition   “in   which”   a   person   is   situated  
whether  or  not  they  realize  it,  and  by  describing  evil  as  a  power  which  “takes  hold”  of  a  person.30  
Likewise,  the  culminating  primary  symbol  of  guilt  recapitulates  the  externality  of  evil  in  terms  of  
the  schema  of  seduction,  the  “evil  [which]  comes  to  a  [person]  as  the  ‘outside’  of  freedom,  as  the  
other   than   itself   in  which   freedom   is   taken   captive.”31   For   this   reason  Ricoeur  wrote   that   “the  
more   historical   and   less   cosmic   symbolism   of   sin   and   guilt   makes   up   for   the   poverty   and  
Joél  Z.  Schmidt  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





abstractness  of  its  imagery  only  by  a  series  of  revivals  and  transpositions  of  the  more  archaic,  but  
more  highly  surcharged,  symbolism  of  defilement.”32  In  this  way,  therefore,  we  witness  another  
example   of   the   deeply   recapitulative   dynamic   in   Ricoeur’s   pattern   of   thinking   which   obtains  
across   a   wide   range   of   diverse   thematic   topics,   and   one   that   since   it   lacks   the   temporal  
qualification   that   attends   both   prophecy   and   utopia   increases   our   appreciation   of   the   formal  
character  of  this  pattern.    
   With  this  notion  of  the  intermingling  of  opposed  symbolisms  we  are  led  to  the  fourth  
and  final  example  of  the  recapitulative  dynamic  to  be  highlighted  in  this  essay,  namely,  Ricoeur’s  
depiction  in  Freud  and  Philosophy  of  the  process  of  symbolization  in  terms  of  sublimation.  As  the  
primary  title  of  this  work  in  the  original  French  (De  l’interprétation)  and  the  English  subtitle  (An  
Essay   on   Interpretation)   suggest,   Ricoeur’s   aim   in   this   book   is   not   simply   to   provide   a   focused  
examination   of   developments   in   Freud’s   thought   for   their   own   sake,   but   rather   in   order   to  
explore   an   hermeneutical   issue   related   to   the   interpretation   of   symbols.   Specifically,   what   to  
make   of   the   fact   that   symbols   can   either   be   interpreted   phenomenologically   in   the  mode   of   a  
recollection  of  meaning  whereby  they  are  believed  to  have  a  revelatory  capacity   to  disclose   the  
sacred,   or   psychoanalytically   in   the  mode   of   unmasking  whereby   they   are   believed   to   distort  
primary  wishes   and  desires   in   their  dissimulated  derivatives?  This   is   a   very  different   question  
than   that   which   animated   Ricoeur’s   The   Symbolism   of   Evil,   which   methodologically   can   be  
subsumed   under   the   rubric   of   a   phenomenological   recovery   of   meaning,   and   which   was  
concerned  with   the  relationship  of  symbols   to  philosophical   reflection.   In  contrast,   in  Freud  and  
Philosophy   Ricoeur   is   concerned   with   whether   recollection   and   unmasking   as   two   ostensibly  
opposed  hermeneutical  strategies  can  be  integrated  within  a  single  hermeneutical  approach,  and  
if  so  in  what  manner.  
   The  first  step  in  exploring  these  questions  is  to  recognize  Ricoeur’s  acknowledgement  
of   the   value   of   Freud’s   work   in   unmasking   the   role   of   desire   in   distorting   the   elementary  
meanings  of  consciousness:  a  certain  work  of  demystification  is  required  if  one  is  to  recognize  the  
instinctual  realities  underlying  the  “illusions  and  lies  of  consciousness.”33  For  Freud  this  held  true  
across  a  wide  range  of  psychological  and  cultural  phenomena,  the  most  basic  of  the  former  being  
the   operation   of   the   primary   process:   in   response   to   a   present   need   the   memories   of   a   past  
satisfaction   are   re-­‐‑activated   so   as   to   provide   an   immediate,   direct   fulfillment.   Of   course,   the  
downside  of  this  shortest  path  to  fulfillment  is  that  the  satisfaction  is  hallucinated  and  not  real.34  
In  a  similar  manner  dreams  too  are  fulfillments  of  desire,  indeed  usually  desires  which  have  been  
prevented  from  entering  consciousness  as  such  through  the  mechanism  of  repression;  as  a  result,  
these   desires  must   enter   consciousness   in   the  mode   of   disguise   via   the   dissimulating   labor   of  
“dream-­‐‑work.”   Through   displacement,   condensation,   pictorial   representation,   and   secondary  
revision  the  psychical  apparatus  traverses  in  its  representations  a  threefold  regression  at  the  root  
of   which   lie   our   archaic   desires,   and   preeminently   our   sexual   desires.35   Even   our   waking  
consciousness  exists  as  a  form  of  perception  and  thus  calls  for  a  psychoanalytic  critique.36  Moving  
to   the  cultural  sphere,  Freud  extended  his  deciphering  psychoanalytic   interpretation   to  cultural  
phenomena   by   construing   art   as   a   psychical   derivative   of   instinctual   representatives,37   and  
religion  as  a  wish-­‐‑fulfillment  of  one  of  humanity’s  oldest  and  deepest  desires:   “the   longing   for  
the   father.”38   Ricoeur   consequently   considered   the   fundamental   insight   of   Freudian  
psychoanalysis   to  be  “a   revelation  of   the  archaic,   a  manifestation  of   the  ever  prior.”39  Freudian  
psychoanalysis   unremittingly   applies   an   approach   of   unmasking   in   its   interpretation   of  
instinctual  representatives  and  symbols,  which  functions  to  decipher  the  monotonous  presence  of  
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desire   under   all   of   its   highly   varied   appearances   thereby   “reduc[ing]   apparent   novelty   by  
showing  that  it  is  actually  a  revival  of  the  old.”40  
   It  is,  however,  precisely  in  relation  to  this  point  that  Ricoeur  posed  his  own  question:  
are   the   productions   of   our   psychic   mechanism   and   culture   only   backward-­‐‑looking,   only  
dissimulations  of  archaic  desire,  or   can   they  not  also  be  prospective,   revelatory,  and  open  new  
possibilities?  As  a  first  step  in  demonstrating  how  this  is  in  fact  the  case  Ricoeur  drew  out  certain  
subterranean   themes   in   Freud’s   analyses   of   art.   In   this   connection   a   key   phrase   for   Ricoeur   is  
Freud’s  statement,  when  describing  the  Mona  Lisa  of  Leonardo  da  Vinci,  that  “It  is  possible  that  in  
these  figures  Leonardo  denied  the  unhappiness  of  his  erotic  life  and  has  triumphed  over  it  in  his  
art….”41   What,   Ricoeur   asked,   is   the   meaning   in   this   context   of   the   words   “denied”   and  
“triumphed  over”?  Might  they  indicate  that  art  can  be  more  than  merely  a  dissimulating  cultural  
analogue  of   the   reproductive  wish-­‐‑fulfillments  of  dreams?  Ricoeur  argued   that   this   is  precisely  
the  case,  that  the  artist  can  create  works  that  “are  not  simply  projections  of  the  artist’s  conflicts,  
but  the  sketch  of  their  solution.”42    
   Ricoeur’s   position   on   this   point   stands   in   some   tension   with   that   of   Freud.   Freud  
considered  symbols  to  be  a  kind  of  stereotyped  code  of  sedimented  meanings  which  the  psyche  
uses   to   represent  desires   in  disguised   form;   the  psyche  does  not  generate   these   symbols   in   the  
primary   process   or   dreamwork,   but  merely  makes   use   of   those   symbols   that   have   previously  
been  generated  elsewhere  and  are  ready  at  hand.  Ricoeur  acknowledged  that  this  is  one  aspect  of  
symbols  but  not   their  only  aspect,   and   in  a   familiar  maneuver  he   rather  argued   for  a   tripartite  
organization   of   symbols.   While   this   tripartite   organization   structurally   echoes   the   analysis   of  
symbols  in  The  Symbolism  of  Evil,  the  content  with  which  Ricoeur  filled  this  structure  in  Freud  and  
Philosophy   is   novel.  At   the   lowest   level   are  worn-­‐‑out   symbols,   part   of   the   stereotyped   cultural  
code   Freud   identified,   where   the   work   of   symbolization   is   in   fact   no   longer   operative;   at   the  
second   level   are   those   symbols   that   contribute   to   the   symbolic   structure  of   action   in  any  given  
society   and   serve   “as   a   token   for   the   nexus   of   social   pacts”;   and   at   the   highest   level   are  
“prospective  symbols”  which  communicate  new  meanings,  and  represent  “the  living  substrate  of  
symbolism.”43  Thus,  in  Ricoeur’s  view  Freud  correctly  identified  one  of  the  functions  of  symbols,  
but   not   the   only   or   the  most   fundamental   function.   For   while   symbols   certainly   can   function  
reproductively   to   represent   monotonous   regressive   desires,   the   most   important   task   is   to  
consider   symbols   in   their   productive   aspect,   according   to   their   capacity   to   generate   new  
meanings.  
   Having  argued  that  this  is  the  case  Ricoeur  subsequently  had  to  confront  the  challenge  
of  how  within  a  psychoanalytic  context  to  articulate  the  manner  in  which  a  prospective  function  
of   symbols   could   obtain,   to   which   end   he   explored   Freud’s   understanding   of   sublimation.44  
Initially  the  relationship  between  progression  and  regression  presents  itself  as  an  opposition,  but  
Ricoeur   wondered   whether   this   ostensible   opposition   was   not   merely   provisional,   and  
preparatory  for  a  further  sublation.  The  Freudian  concept  of  sublimation  presents  an  alternative  
to   a   purely   oppositional   relationship   between   progression   and   regression,   and   this  
notwithstanding   the   fact   that   in   Freud’s   own   treatment   the  mode   of   operation   of   sublimation  
remains   a   “riddle,”   “as   much   a   problem   as   a   solution”   since   the   more   Freud   distinguishes  
sublimation   from   the   other   psychic   mechanisms   “the   more   its   own   mechanism   remains  
unexplained.”45   Ricoeur   considered   the   solution   to   this   enigma   to   lie   in   Freud’s   notion   that  
sublimation  involves  the  diversion  of  desires  from  their  original  aims  to  new  aims.  It  is  of  course  
a   crucial   psychoanalytic   insight   that  while   the   objects   of   desire   are   highly   variable   the   desires  
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themselves  remain  unchanging.  However,  the  unique  quality  of  sublimation  is  that  not  only  can  
desire’s  objects  be  varied,  but  that  even  its  aim  can  be  diverted.  
   An   important   conclusion   arising   from   this   analysis   is   that   although   it   is   vitally  
important  to  recognize  the  genuine  difference  between  reproductive  psychic  representations  and  
innovative   cultural   productions,   they   are   not   utterly   heterogeneous.   Both   share   the   same  
“hyletic,”   the   “matter”   of   desire,   but   differ   crucially  with   respect   to   their   “transformation”   or  
“diversion”  of  aim.46  Hence  Ricoeur  asked,  “Could  it  be  that  the  true  meaning  of  sublimation  is  to  
promote  new  meanings  by  mobilizing  old  energies  initially  invested  in  archaic  figures?”47  If  this  
is  the  case,  then:  
Advancement   of   meaning   occurs   only   in   the   sphere   of   the  
projections  of  desire,  of  the  derivatives  of  the  unconscious,  of  the  
revivals  of  archaism.  We  nourish  our   least   carnal   symbols  with  
desires   that   have   been   checked,   deviated,  
transformed…[Indeed,]   insofar   as   revealing   and   disguising  
coincide   in   it,   we   might   say   that   sublimation   is   the   symbolic  
function  itself.48  
This   final   example   highlights   with   particular   force   Ricoeur’s   conservative,   generous   or  
recapitulative  impulse  toward  what  is  basic  and  even  base  in  the  human  constitution,  and  which  
recapitulative   dynamic   the   four   examples   outlined   in   this   essay   have   illustrated.   There   are   of  
course  other,  perhaps  more   complicated   thematic   foci  one   could   list   as   illustrative  examples  of  
this  dynamic:  for  example,  how  in  his  philosophy  of  the  self  Ricoeur  recapitulated  the  apparently  
regressive   notions   of   the   “self”   and   “self-­‐‑love”   in   his   own   understandings   of   attestation,   self-­‐‑
esteem,  and  self-­‐‑respect;49  or  how  in   tracing   the  course  of   recognition  Ricoeur  recapitulated   the  
logical  sense  of  identification  in  being-­‐‑recognized.50  By  focusing  on  the  particular  examples  here  
selected,   in   this  essay   I  have  sought   to  provide  a  kind  of  heuristic   that  can  operate   to  help  one  
discover  a  similar  recapitulative  dynamic  in  a  variety  of  other  places  in  Ricoeur’s  corpus.  
   For   Ricoeur   scholars   this   recapitulative   pattern   of   thinking   is   interesting   because   it  
cuts  across  Ricoeur’s  philosophical  and  theological  writings.  As  a  number  of  commentators  have  
emphasized,51   throughout   his   career   Ricoeur   certainly   sought   to   maintain   a   clear   distinction  
between   these   two   categories   by   means   of   a   kind   of   “conceptual   asceticism.”   However,   in,  
through,   and   beneath   it   the   recapitulative   pattern   of   thinking   here   described   connects   with  
Ricoeur’s  recognition  that  he  was  not  unaffected  by  his  operative  interests  and  commitments.  As  
he  acknowledged  in  the  Introduction  to  Oneself  as  Another,  “I  do  not  claim  that  at  the  deep  level  
of  motivations  these  [theological]  convictions  remain  without  any  effect  on  the  interest  I  take  in  
this  or  that  problem,  even  in  the  overall  problematic  of  the  self.”52  
   If   we   acknowledge   this   to   be   true,   then   it   is   appropriate   to   follow   up   by   inquiring  
about  the  origins  of  the  pattern  of  thinking  here  identified:  whence  recapitulation?  Is  this  pattern  
essentially   theological   and   Christian   at   its   base,   inasmuch   as   it   reflects   a   transposition   of   the  
fundamental   theme   of   salvation   for   sinners,   or   love   of   enemies?   Perhaps.53   Or   is   it   simply   an  
iteration  of  Ricoeur’s  famous  self-­‐‑description  of  his  methodology  as  a  post-­‐‑Hegelian  Kantianism?  
Again,  perhaps.54    
   While   the   task   of   identifying   the   source   of   this   recurring   pattern   of   thought   in  
Ricoeur’s   corpus   remains   a   question   for   another   investigation,   it   does   lead   to   a   final   and  
important  observation  that  itself  recapitulates  a  theme  introduced  at  the  beginning  of  this  essay.  
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Namely,  in  a  surprising  and  apparent  reversal  toward  the  end  of  his  life,  Ricoeur  himself  called  
into   question   the   “asceticism   of   argument”   to   which   he   sought   to   adhere   throughout   his  
intellectual  career.  In  the  dialogue  entitled  “On  Life  Stories”  recorded  between  2001-­‐‑2003,  Ricoeur  
offered  the  following  striking  comments:  
I  might  even  concede  here  a  point  made  recently  by  my  young  
colleagues,   Dominico   Jervolino   and   Fabrizio   Turoldo,   that   my  
thought   is   not   so   removed   from   certain   religious   and   biblical  
issues   as  my   standard   policy   of   “conceptual   asceticism”  might  
have  been  prepared  to  admit  in  the  past.  I  am  not  sure  about  the  
absolute   irreconcilability   between   the  God   of   the   Bible   and   the  
God  of  Being.  The  tendency  of  modern  French  thought  to  eclipse  
the  Middle  Ages  has  prevented  us   from  acknowledging  certain  
very  rich  attempts  to  think  God  and  being  in  terms  of  each  other.  
I  no  longer  consider  such  conceptual  asceticism  tenable.55  
In  the  context  of  Ricoeur’s  long  held  and  strictly  maintained  distinction  between  philosophy  and  
theology,  these  comments  are  very  startling.  Moreover,  Ricoeur’s  reference  to  “certain  very  rich”  
medieval  attempts  to  think  God  and  being  in  terms  of  each  other  presents  a  stark  contrast  with  
the  methodological   approach  Ricoeur  described   in  his   introduction   to  Oneself   as  Another.  There  
Ricoeur  was  very  careful   to   identify   that  even   the  ontological  study  which  concludes  Oneself  as  
Another   is  “conducted  within  the  dimension  of  a  philosophical  hermeneutics  [which]  consists  in  
an  ontological  investigation  that  involves  no  ontotheological  amalgamations.”56  
   Growing  out  of  this  observation,  the  following  question  arises  in  relation  to  the  theme  
of   this   essay:   beyond   existing   as   a   subterranean   intellectual   pattern   underlying   both   Ricoeur’s  
philosophical   and   theological   works,   does   this   methodological   reassessment   represent   the  
emergence   of   Ricoeur’s   recapitulative   pattern   of   thinking   from   an   implicit   to   an   explicitly  
thematic  level?  Does  this  move  away  from  a  concern  that  theology  might  contaminate  the  purity  
of  philosophical  reflection  exist  as  the  ultimate  example  of  Ricoeur’s  recapitulative  generosity,  of  
his  being  generous  to  a  fault?  Up  to  this  point  the  phrase  “generous  to  a  fault”  has  functioned  in  
this  essay  primarily  to  describe  a  pattern  of  thinking  that  is  generous  to  everything  in  us  that  is  
regressive   and   archaic,   in   short   a   pattern   of   generosity   to   our   faults.   In   addition   it   has   also  
functioned  to  express  an  implicit,  appreciative  evaluation  of  this  recapitulative  pattern.  However,  
at   this   point   the   possibility   of   a   new   semantic   valence   emerges   in   line   with   the   negative  
connotation   of   this   expression   in   everyday   language.   Has   Ricoeur   here   gone   too   far?   In   re-­‐‑
opening   the   possibility   of   ontotheological   amalgamations   must   we   in   fact   hold   Ricoeur  
accountable   for   the   potentially   damaging   effects   of   his   reckless   generosity?   In   relation   to   this  
theme  Ricoeur’s  generous  impulses  will  appear  to  many  as  excessively  prodigal,  flirting  with  the  
edge,  as  courting  intellectual  disaster.  
   Whatever  our  evaluation  of  this  particular  point,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  whether  it  
is   not   the   very   prodigality   of   Ricoeur’s   generosity   that   infuses   his   recapitulative   pattern   of  
thinking  with  its  power.  Here  we  are  perhaps  in  the  realm  of  the  impassioning  impossible,  or  the  
excessive   gift,   and   it   seems   likely   that   the   recapitulative   pattern   of   Ricoeur’s   thinking   offers  
significant   resources   for   reflecting  upon   the  pressing  needs  of  our  day   in   a  variety  of  domains  
precisely   in  proportion   to   its   prodigality.   In   this   respect   the   recurring   recapitulative  pattern   in  
Ricoeur’s  thinking  seem  to  reflect  something  of  the  paradoxes  he  explored  at  the  end  of  Memory,  
History,  Forgetting  in  relation  to  the  vertical  asymmetry  that  spans  “the  great  height  of  the  spirit  of  
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forgiveness   and   the   abyss   of   guilt.”57   It   is   relatively   easy   to   laud  Ricoeur’s   generous   approach  
when   it   recapitulates  an  archaism   that  has  already  been   tamed,  a  domesticated   regression;   it   is  
much  harder  to  appreciate  such  an  approach  when  it  concerns  an  archaism  by  which  we  still  feel  
threatened.  However,   it   is  precisely   at   this  point   that   the  power  of  Ricoeur’s   approach   is  most  
forcefully  manifest,   for   it  suggests   that  our  prophetic  visions,   far   from  being  able   to  cut  off  our  
most  regressive  tendencies,  arise  out  of  the  substrate  of  our  individual  and  collective  archaisms.  
What  resources  might   this   insight  offer   to  us   in  our  own  contemporary  context,   for  example   in  
relation  to  the  ongoing  financial  crisis  which  to  a  significant  extent  seems  to  have  arisen  out  of  the  
occlusion   of   an   enlightened   self-­‐‑interest   by   distorted   perceptions   of   immediate   self-­‐‑interest?   If  
Ricoeur   is   correct   that   the  way   to  a  better   future  does  not   lie   in  attempting   to   cut  off   the  most  
regressive   parts   of   ourselves,   we   can   expect   that   prospective   visions   suggesting   the   simple  
eradication  of  “greed”  will   in  fact  be  ineffective  and  unrealistic.  How,  rather,  to  incorporate  the  
dynamics  of  self-­‐‑interest  in  our  efforts  to  establish  a  more   just  society?  How  to  recapitulate  this  
regressive  passion  into  efforts  directed  toward  “aiming  at  the  ‘good  life’  with  and  for  others,   in  
just  institutions”?  In  such  concrete  examples  which  affect  the  material  reality  of  people’s  lives  we  
see   that   what   is   at   stake   in   Ricoeur’s   recapitulative   pattern   of   thinking   is   not   merely   an  
intellectual   abstraction.   The   frequently   recapitulative   nature   of   Ricoeur’s   insights   indicates   the  
importance,   stakes,   and   risks  associated  not   just  with   the  content  of  Ricoeur’s   thought  but  also  
with   the  way   in  which  he  did  his   thinking,   a  pattern  which   above   all  was  generous,   generous  
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poles on the extremes of a shared continuum, i.e., there is no absolute separation between 
reproductive and productive imaginative functions, they can be combined in different proportions. 
45 Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy, 172, 175 and 487 respectively. 
46 Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy, 521. 
47 Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy, 175 
48 Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy, 497. See also Ricoeur’s powerfully concise statement that the symbol is 
“the concrete ‘mixed texture’ in which we see both archeology and teleology” (Ibid., 494). 
49For example, we can think of the way in which in his philosophy of the self Ricoeur did not completely 
banish all notion of the cogito, but rather allowed a limited place for a meta-level of self-awareness by 
which a person grasps “the unifying principle of the operations among which it is dispersed and 
forgets itself as subject.” Paul Ricoeur, “On Interpretation,” in From Text to Action, trans. Kathleen 
Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 12. Indeed, he 
recapitulated the (in his context) regressive notion of “reflection” associated the self-constituting 
cogito in his own more complex and mediated understanding of “concrete reflection.” Or we could 
explore how at the heart of his ethical vision -- of “aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for others, in just 
institutions” -- he recapitulated the apparently regressive notions of the “self” and “self-love” in his 
own understandings of self-esteem and self-respect. 
50Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2005), 250. As an interesting aside, this is the only context I am aware of in which Ricoeur 
used the term “recapitulation” to label the dynamic I have described throughout this essay. 
51For a recent example see: Boyd Blundell, Paul Ricoeur Between Theology and Philosophy: Detour and 
Return (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
52Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 24 
53At first blush it certainly would not appear to be very difficult to draw connections between the dynamic 
I have described here and the poetic biblical representations of salvation for sinners, and even the 
term I have used throughout this paper, “recapitulation,” has an important Irenaean heritage in 
Christian usage. Another point in favor of this line of thinking would be the observation of how some 
of Ricoeur’s philosophical expressions echo the relatively refined theological soteriological formulation 
of Thomas Aquinas that “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it” (Summa Theologiae, Pt.1, 
Q.1, A.8, Reply 2). See for example Ricoeur’s statement that the rootedness of sublimation in our 
experience, including especially our primitive and primordial instincts, “keeps man’s cultural existence 
from being simply a huge artifice, a futile ‘artifact,’ a Leviathan without a nature and against nature.” 
Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy, 524. See similar comments to this effect in Paul Ricoeur, “Freedom in 
the Light of Hope,” trans. Robert Sweeney, in Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007), 412, and the related observation that “The passion for the 
possible must graft itself onto real tendencies.” 
54However, one benefit of the language of “recapitulation” used in this essay is that it brings out other 
dimensions than the dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Furthermore, it would perhaps be 
necessary to complicate the categorization further by interrogating to what extent Hegel himself was 
a Christian thinker, albeit a creatively heterodox one. See Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel 
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